SOME REFLECTIONS FROM A PERFORMANCE ENGINEERING PERSPECTIVE ON HEROS and CHARACTERS FROM THE U.S. NAVY DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

by Wesley W. Stillwagon

Entire Contents Copyrighted ©1997 Wesley W. Stillwagon Sr.

~December 1941

"...It was at that juncture that Kirk and Captain Howard D. Bode, one of ONI's (Office of Naval Intelligence) most conscientious officers and then head of foreign intelligence..." (Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton US Navy (Retired), "And I Was There," sub-titled, "Pearl Harbor and Midway-Breaking the Secrets" Page 166, Quill edition, William Morrow, New York.)

August 9, 1942 Battle of Savo Island

"...(Heavy Cruiser) Chicago was similarly surprised. Captain (H. D.) Bode, who in Crutchley's absence was O. T. C. of this group, was awakened out of a sound sleep by gunfire, and, with a column of five heavy cruisers to shoot at, steamed off in pursuit of Mikawa's lone destroyer, little the worse for one shell hit and one torpedo explosion well forward. Chicago was out of the battle...

Captain Bode of (USS) Chicago, whose stupidity was largely responsible for that cruiser's inglorious part in the battle, committed suicide."(Samuel Eliot Morison, "The Two Ocean War, A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War," Pages 173 and 176, Little, Brown and Company)

Two highly respected naval history writers, Layton and Morison, harbored as wide an opinion of the abilities of Howard D. Bode as one could assemble. Layton had the advantage of working with Bode, Morison had not. But I would guess, if it were possible to ask them when they made those observations, to explain further what they mean by the terms "conscientious" and "stupidity," we'd have little more to work with than those obviously subjective opinions. Subjective or not, they had obvious reasons for their selection of those terms based upon observations, Captain Bodes' personality, and research. Perhaps, while not academically correct, there was evidence for the positive or negative value of each writer's observations. In the analytical and relatively safe world of Naval Intelligence, Captain Bode would do very well, but regardless of his intelligence performance, a promotion to command a ship of the line was the wrong move for the Navy at that time.

But what process enabled such a promotion? I would hazard a guess that Captain Bode was an exceptional Naval Academy Graduate, with good grades in virtually every area. His performance during his intelligence assignments must have been superior. Typically, such good performance is rewarded with promotion and an increasing command assignment. But the promotion is a result of politics, and performance within the job at hand. No process is in place assuring the right qualifications to handle all of the tasks of a job, nor has there ever been. Primarily, this is due to the lack of a system or ability to properly define tasks, and/or to measure human factors necessary to their successful execution.

With all of the honors bestowed upon the writing of Naval historian Morison, his choice of the word "stupidity" in describing the failure of Captain Bode was poor. In a world that measures intelligence in some cases by the aggregate total of correctly recalled answers to questions (rather than the proper application of knowledge, skills or techniques); to call Captain Bodes' action "stupid" would leave an interested person with too little information. Stupid implies a lack of knowledge (know what's and know how's); his action was hardly one befitting that description. His actions, in my opinion, were a result of a lack of will to engage the enemy as expected. Knowledge wasn't a problem; he demonstrated this in his previous job, and perhaps at every previous point in his Navy career. I believe, with the concepts of Performance Engineering?, we could have dissected Captain Bode's psyche to reveal a weakness in courage under the fear of personal harm, or as defined by some as cowardice. Waiting until he is in the position to harm a campaign or his shipmates to find this out is patently poor judgment. The Navy lacked at that time (and still does) the ability to define and quantify courage under the fear of personal harm. It doesn't know how to discern the impact of the emotions upon an individual's performance. It doesn't even have the language, let alone the concepts necessary for this evaluation. It could with Performance Engineering?. Because methods are available to safely test the elements of the following:

His education, training and development, could have been carefully checked if his leaders had an practical understanding of the performance engineering concepts. His performance prior to his assignment as commanding officer could have been checked and recorded in a useful manner, regarding his courage under fire. His record would have contained a more complete working profile of the man with his strengths, weaknesses, and efforts toward correction.

II. Captain Miles E. Browning

~May, 1938

"... From time to time, especially when foul weather grounded the planes, Halsey would assemble the pilots in a big drill hall for lectures, discussions and war games...

Admiral Halsey had early spotted one of the squadron commanders, Lieutenant Commander Miles Browning, as intelligent, and knowledgeable and appointed him his deputy in conducting the discussions. Thomas H. Moorer, a future CNO (Chief of Naval Operations) and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then a junior lieutenant, recalls the difference in their styles. Halsey, says Moorer, "had a knack of involving everybody in the discussion." He was genuinely interested and recognized merit in good ideas whether coming from himself or the most junior officers. "Everybody," according to Moorer, "was crazy about Admiral Halsey."

Browning on the contrary, they found somewhat cold. He tended to lecture rather than hold discussions, often opening on a sarcastic note such as, "If you are so fortunate as still to be in the Navy when we encounter the Japanese..." He knew his business, the pilots agreed, but his aloof and condescending manner prejudiced them against his opinions and advice." (E. B. Potter, "Bull Halsey, a Biography," Naval Institute Press, pages 139-140)

-Mid September, 1940

"...Though it was the army's duty to defend the Hawaiian Islands and also the ships of the Pacific Fleet when they were in Pearl Harbor, Admiral Kimmel maintained close liaison with Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, commanding the Hawaiian Department, and organized a committee to work out plans for supplementing the army's defense of Pearl Harbor. Halsey's representative on the defense committee was Commander Miles Browning.

Halsey cautioned Browning to be on his good behavior at the committee meetings and at all costs to keep his temper in check. Browning managed to maintain his cool and impress his fellow members with his intelligence and quick thinking (which I believe was intuition), but when things were not to his liking, he used his superb command of Robert's Rules of Order to tie the conference in knots over questions of procedure." (E. B. Potter, "Bull Halsey," Naval Institute Press, page 148)

April 19, 1942

"... At 1400 on the nineteenth officers and enlisted men on the Big E's (carrier Enterprise) signal bridge sighted inside the task force screen what appeared to be a periscope. One of their number, Flag Lieutenant Ashford, signaled the location of the object to the task force. A cruiser, without awaiting orders, promptly opened fire. Captain Miles Browning, dozing in his cabin, after being up most of the night, awoke with a start, leapt from his bunk, and, in a rage, stormed up to the bridge. He ordered a cease-fire, then turned wrathfully on Ashford, whom he proceeded to chew out, calling into question his competence, his judgment, even his intelligence. He broke off his tirade only when Admiral Halsey appeared on the bridge.

Ashford, convinced he had seen the periscope, told his story to the admiral. He recommended that fueling, scheduled to begin at 1600, be postponed. The task force should continue on course until well after nightfall, then wheel ninety degrees and proceed on the new course for about an hour. Fueling would be carried out under the cover of darkness. Browning strongly opposed Ashford's recommendations and resumed his denunciation of the Flag Lieutenant. Halsey silenced his chief with a glance and directed Ashford to put his plan into effect. Browning paled, stalked off, and went below to sulk."(E. B. Potter, "Bull Halsey," Naval Institute Press, page 65)

June 4, 1942

"He (Admiral Spruance) turned to Browning in the attempt to outguess Naguma. Spruance inherited his chief of staff from Halsey who "thought he was wonderful." Browning had the disposition of a snapping turtle and Spruance admitted freely that "during the war in the Pacific people hated his guts." But "Browning was smart and quick," and Spruance was not running a charm school. Browning had the aviation know-how that Spruance needed, which was all that concerned the imperturbable admiral."(Gordon W. Prange, "Miracle at Midway," McGraw-Hill, Page 239)

June 16, 1942

"... Plotting the distance to the target. Spruance's staff knew that the flight would be dangerously near the point of no return for the Dauntless (aircraft). Nonetheless, their orders called for arming the planes with 1,000-pound bombs. Although grounded, McClusky regarded himself as responsible for his men. The previous day, he had lost valuable planes and good comrades for the lack of fuel and inaccurate information on the enemy's position necessitated an extended search. So after making his own calculations and confirming them with Short and Shumway, McClusky climbed the three decks to flag plot. There he asked Browning that the planes carry 500 pound bombs and their takeoff be delayed for an hour. The lighter bomb load would cut down on fuel consumption; the delay would permit a closer approach.

Despite the cogency of McClusky's arguments, Browning refused his request. McClusky persisted. The irresistible force of the air group commander's logic and sense of responsibility collided with the immovable object - Browning's obstinacy. The resulting friction heated up.

To one side, Spruance had been checking plots with other staff officers. Now he stepped up to the table where Browning and McClusky were having it out. He spoke directly to McClusky: "I'll do whatever you pilots want." Browning retired to his cabin in a fit of the sulks. There he remained until Lieutenant Colonel Julian Brown, the task force's Marine officer, persuaded him to return to his duty post."(Gordon W. Prange, "Miracle at Midway," McGraw Hill page 331_

~Summer, 1943

"Admirals King and Nimitz had long been dissatisfied with Halsey's chief of staff, attributing the admiral's occasional lapses in judgment at least in part to Miles Browning's influence...

Nimitz and King believed that with a wiser counselor than Browning at his side, Halsey might be preserved from the painful and embarrassing errors that marred his otherwise sterling record.

Secretary Knox, shocked during his January visit by Browning's behavior, had been campaigning ever since to have him transferred. Halsey stoutly resisted the transfer, countering every move to relieve Browning with a recommendation to have him promoted to flag rank. Valuing his chief of staff's professional expertise, he was willing to put up with his eccentricities. Perhaps also he felt protective toward Browning because nobody else could stand him. At last King (CNO) lured Browning away with a bait so attractive that Halsey could no longer stand in his way - nothing less than command of the new carrier Hornet (the one I was on for two years), then near completion. Aviators resented Browning's being handed this choice assignment, but King insisted that "the idea was to get rid of him at once, whatever the price."

Predictably, Browning mishandled his new assignment. He berated the Hornet's department heads savagely, usually without making clear what he was raving about. He kept his crew so on edge that a minor explosion on board incited a riot in which two men fell overboard and drowned. Browning's failure to muster and send out a boat led to a court of inquiry, which found him guilty of negligence, whereupon Admiral Mitscher, then commander of the Fast Carrier Task Force, requested his immediate relief. Browning spent the rest of the war exiled on the faculty of an army staff college."(E. B. Potter, "Bull Halsey," Naval Institute Press, pages 243, 244)

Thank God for the gallantry of Nimitz, Ernest King, Halsey, Spruance, and etc. or the war would have been longer and much more costly. But the damage done by Browning and Bode, and the failure to directly address the human issues prior to their getting into trouble was preventable. This is a pretty sad state of affairs which hasn't changed appreciably to this day. With a sound individual development plan and tracking, they would have had to change dramatically prior to receiving the license to wield so much power and influence.

I offer as further evidence of my opinion of the failure of the US Navy to establish sound standards of human performance, performance improvement, and development:

1. the Navy has been sued by the parents of a trainee, drowned by his instructors in an excercise whose relevancy to performance objectives was questionable to say the least;

2. the miserable handling of events after the terrible explosion in battleship Iowa's number two turret;

3. the Navy spends a lot more on the study of the behavior of Dolphins then on the study of the elements of the performance of people. The people in the Navy are much more important and far outnumber the dolphins.

This lack of appreciation of what can be accomplished to make all organizations more productive and rewarding for participators is a world-wide problem. Motivating systems have not kept up to date with the changes in the workforce. Motivating systems are generally constructed within constraints of the needs of the work population which induce wants, which are fulfilled depending upon the behavior or performance expected. Our workforce has out sophisticated our means of motivating.

Abraham Maslow developed a model corresponding to human needs which naturally resulted in wants. He said that there seems to be a hierarchy into which human needs arrange themselves as illustrated thus:

He stated that the fundamental needs, physiological (food, shelter) must be satisfied prior to the influence of the higher level needs. If we can accept this, and we have some vision of the needs of the population of a given country, we can predict on a collective basis the needs which will dominate the wants.

If we consider the changes in the distribution of the need fulfillment in the more developed countries in the last fifty years, we can see that the motivation factors should have changed to reflect the change in wants and needs. Compounding the problem is the absense of an appreciation of the individual. A person who has reached the "Self-Actualization" level has, I believe, also reached a high level of what Swiss Psychiatrist Carl G. Jung called "individuation." This being so, then we can assume, as the term implies, a raised consciousness of who we are; our individual character becomes both a tool and determiner of our particular style in dealing with life. With this realization, the motivating factors which were selected for the collective become decreasingly appropriate for the individual. Realistically, we are not all created equal and it is the proper orchestration of the gifts of individuality which truly makes an organization great. The motivators selected for the engineering staff would be quite different from the ones selected for the marketing group, etc.

The purpose of HallowQuest^TM is to provide processes and philosophy for improving the selection, qualification and human performance in an increasingly dynamic, and changing society.

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